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Abstract
We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections using individual-level ad-
ministrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of
Parliament in a voter-level Regression Discontinuity Design, we find no effect of Senate voting
eligibility on voter turnout or information acquisition. We also estimate city-level Differences-
in-Differences showing that concurrent high-salience municipal elections increase turnout in
lower-salience provincial and European elections, but not vice-versa. These concurrency ef-
fects are concentrated in municipalities in the South of Italy, possibly due to weaker political
parties and lower levels of social capital.
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1 Introduction
Low voter turnout is commonly considered a threat to the legitimacy of representative democ-
racy (Lijphart, 1997). Low electoral participation, in fact, usually means unequal participation
and unequal government responsiveness to citizens’ needs (Avery, 2015; Franko, Kelly and Witko,
2016; Hajnal and Trounstine, 2005; Hill and Leighley, 1992). Yet, voter turnout in many estab-
lished democracies has been decreasing over the last decades (Blais, 2010; Gaebler, Potrafke and
Roesel, 2020), with little or no success by policy-makers to attenuate or reverse this trend.
Exploring the theoretical reasons for low and unequal participation, a growing literature high-
lights that many low-turnout countries, notably the U.S., display a high number and frequency of
elections (e.g., Taylor et al., 2014). Frequent elections can reduce participation because more
numerous elections increase information costs and require more time and effort from citizens
(Leininger, Rudolph and Zittlau, 2016), potentially lowering voters’ motivation to be civically
engaged (Garmann, 2017). These negative effects tend to be particularly consequential in “second-
order” elections at the regional and local level, especially so if they are held “off-cycle” (Lijphart,
1997). Yet, if election frequency increases the cost of participation, holding multiple elections
concurrently seems a natural way to increase voter participation. Moreover, if different groups of
voters care differentially about different elections, election timing may affect the composition of
the electorate (Anzia, 2011; Halberstam and Montagnes, 2015; Leininger, Rudolph and Zittlau,
2016). Concurrent elections seem particularly promising to increase turnout among young voters,
whose levels of participation are dismally low in many democracies (Hajnal and Trounstine, 2005;
Kogan, Lavertu and Peskowitz, 2018).
In spite of the strong theoretical expectation that concurrent elections should raise levels of
turnout, the prior empirical evidence is ambiguous. In a meta-analysis, Geys (2006) showed that
about half of surveyed studies found a positive and statistically significant association between
concurrency and turnout, whereas the other half found either null or negative effects. Recent work
leverages Differences-in-Differences (DD) designs and provides a robust body of empirical evi-
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dence showing that holding lower salience elections on the same day as higher salience elections
may increase turnout in the U.S. (Anzia, 2011; Kogan, Lavertu and Peskowitz, 2018) and Eu-
rope (Fauvelle-Aymar and François, 2015; Garmann, 2016; Leininger, Rudolph and Zittlau, 2016).
However, this literature also suggests that the magnitude and consequences of these effects depend
on the political and social context. In particular, the electoral and policy implications of elec-
tion timing may vary depending on the level of voter mobilization by political parties and interest
groups (Anzia, 2011; Kogan, Lavertu and Peskowitz, 2018). Yet, we know little about the voter-
level processes that affect turnout and the composition of the electorate in concurrent elections –
also because the prior literature focuses primarily on aggregate-level shocks in election timing.
Thus, the conditions under which concurrency increases turnout remain elusive.
We contribute by leveraging two quasi-experiments from Italy. First, we exploit a peculiarity
of the Italian constitution; namely, the existence of two distinct voting ages for the two Houses
of the Italian Parliament: 18 years for the Chamber of Deputies, and 25 years for the Senate. In
other words, after turning 25, Italian voters are faced with two high-salience concurrent elections,
while voters aged 18 to 25 can only vote for the Chamber of Deputies. We thus use a Regres-
sion Discontinuity Design (RDD) to analyze voter turnout and information acquisition around the
Senate voting-age threshold. Because Italian electoral campaigns do not target individual voters,1
our RDD analysis allows to estimate the turnout effect of the additional Senate ballot holding the
overall salience of the election constant, meaning that treated (i.e., voters 25 or older) and control
voters (i.e., voters younger than 25) were exposed to identical campaigns and media environ-
ments, among others. This natural quasi-experiment provides an opportunity to study the effects
of individual-level variation in election concurrence.
Our RDD analysis on administrative voter-level data shows that Senate voting eligibility has no
impact on turnout. Similarly, survey data we collected specifically for this study during the 2013
Italian general election reveal that voters across the 25-year cutoff report the same voting behavior
and are, among others, equally likely to remember the names of Senate candidates running in their
1See Cantoni and Pons (N.d.); Novelli (2018) on the impersonal, unsophisticated campaign methods used today in
Italy.
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district. This suggests that Senate voting eligibility has no effect on information acquisition either.
The zero impact of Senate voting eligibility on turnout and knowledge about candidates is sur-
prising. The 2006–2013 Italian electoral system made it harder for parties to muster a majority
of seats in the Senate than in the Chamber of Deputies (see Section 2). This feature of the Italian
electoral system was widely covered by Italian pundits ahead of elections, suggesting that the lack
of effects is not driven by the Senate election being perceived as inconsequential. Overall, this
finding provides a first piece of evidence that the effect of concurrency on turnout is highly depen-
dent on the political context of an election, including the salience and level of party mobilization,
which is held constant in our RDD analysis due to the lack of sophistication of Italian campaigns
(e.g., no micro-targeting).
Second, we employ a municipality-level DD design based on quasi-random variation in the
calendars of Italian municipal, provincial, regional, national, and European elections to analyze the
effects of different combinations of concurrent elections on turnout and counts of valid ballots cast.
Although elections of each type are usually held every 5 years, their calendars often shift over time
due to early elections (e.g., caused by the death of a city’s mayor or by snap national elections),
thus creating plausibly exogenous within-city and within-Election-Day variation in the number
and types of concurrent elections. This design allows to explore the heterogeneity of effects by
the relative salience of concurring elections (e.g., a high-salience election concurring with a lower-
salience one vs. a low-salience election concurring with a higher-salience one), where we proxy the
salience of a certain election type (e.g., municipal elections) with average turnout absent concurrent
elections (i.e., without concurring provincial, regional, and national elections).
Our city-level DD reveals that high-salience elections increase turnout and the number of valid
ballots cast when they concur with lower-salience elections. The impact of concurrent high-
salience elections is large in magnitude. For example, concurrent municipal elections increase
turnout at provincial, European, and regional elections by 11.8, 9.9, and 7 percentage points, re-
spectively, which translate to an increase in valid ballots casts of 9, 7.2, and 4.8 percentage points,
respectively, despite also increasing invalid ballots cast by 2.7, 2.7, and 2.2 percentage points, re-
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spectively. Conversely, turnout effects of concurrent low-salience elections are more nuanced and
generally heterogeneous: they are positive and significant only in southern regions and are larger
when differences in concurring elections are more marked (e.g., when low-salience provincial
elections concur with European rather than with regional elections).
Several explanations help to reconcile the seemingly conflicting findings from our DD and
RDD exercises. In Italian parliamentary elections, voters are not targeted separately by electoral
campaigns for the House and Senate elections. This feature might lead voters to consider the two
elections as if they were a single election, a conflation that reduces the marginal benefit voters
derive from the additional Senate ballot.2 By contrast, concurrent elections of different types
induce voters who are primarily interested in the higher-salience election to also cast a valid ballot
for the lower-salience one. This suggests that, when concurrent elections are perceived as different
from one another and their concurrence “changes” the electoral environment (e.g., resulting in
more intense campaigns and/or heightened media attention than if the same elections were held
separately), Italian voters face relatively small costs of acquiring information for the lower-salience
election. Finally, concurrency effects are concentrated in municipalities in the South of Italy, which
suggests that these effects are stronger in regions where the ties between political parties and voters
are weaker and levels of social capital are lower (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994).
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, our voter-level RDD is unique in that it
generates individual-level variation in the number of elections voters face (two for voters 25 or
older, one for younger voters), while keeping the political context plausibly constant. Our null
RDD finding points to heightened overall electoral salience as a key mechanism of the turnout
effect of concurrent elections. Moreover, our unique survey data suggest that concurrent Upper and
Lower House elections in Italy do not affect knowledge about candidates, likely because political
campaigns do not differentially target likely voters – in contrast to concurrent Presidential and
Senate elections in the U.S., where information asymmetries may lead to distortions in vote choice
(Halberstam and Montagnes, 2015).
2At polling locations, Italian voters receive one paper ballot for each election (e.g., municipal, provincial, regional,
Chamber of Deputies, Senate) they are eligible to vote for on that Election Day.
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Second, while several authors have studied concurrent elections of different salience separately
and in different contexts, we analyze concurrent elections in a unified setting and use our DD
estimates to compare the effects of different combinations of high- and low-salience concurrent
elections, which allows us to identify sources of heterogeneity. For example, using a subset of the
data we use in our city-level analysis, Bracco and Revelli (2018) find that concurrent municipal
elections increase voter turnout in less-salient provincial elections, while Revelli (2017) shows that
turnout in municipal elections is higher when these contests concur with higher-salience national
elections. Similarly, in their study of the electoral determinants of city performance in 93 large
Italian municipalities, 2001–2010, Lo Prete and Revelli (2020) find that concurrent national par-
liamentary elections increase turnout in municipal elections, while concurrent European, regional,
and provincial elections do not.3 In the U.S., Fowler (2015) observes that the Democratic guber-
natorial candidate’s vote share is, on average, 6.4 percentage points higher in states with on-cycle
gubernatorial elections. We show that turnout effects hinge crucially on the relative salience of the
concurrent races. Moreover, we find that concurrency effects are concentrated in the South of Italy.
Overall, we interpret our results as suggestive of the importance of the social and political context
in mediating invidual responses to concurrent elections.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss, respectively, the research setting and
the data. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses theoretical implications in a unified
framework. Section 6 concludes.
2 Research Setting
We rely on two sources of plausibly exogenous variation in the number and types of elections
Italian voters face on Election Day. First, we exploit a peculiarity of the Italian legislature, namely
the existence of different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament. Second, we use quasi-
random variation in the concurrence of municipal, provincial, and regional elections with local and
3Unlike our specifications, their regressions do not control for Election Day fixed effects, which allows them to




Italy features a perfectly bicameral legislature: the Parliament consists of two Houses that share
the same powers and separately perform identical functions. All Members of Parliament (MPs) are
elected on the same day and remain in power until the next election. Any MP can propose new
bills, which, to become laws, must be approved in the same text by both Houses of Parliament.
Either House can oust the executive passing a motion of no confidence, and a joint session of
Parliament elects the President of the Republic.
The two Houses differ in a few minor features, including different sizes (i.e., 630 and 315
members for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, respectively4) and different minimum ages
to become a member (i.e., 25 and 40 years to become a deputy or a senator, respectively). Histor-
ically, the two Houses have also been characterized by different electoral systems. Between 1993
and 2005, the Chamber and the Senate featured two slightly different “hybrid” electoral systems,
each characterized by the coexistence of proportional and majoritarian components. From 2006 to
2013, members of both Houses were elected using a closed-list proportional system with majority
premium (i.e., a guaranteed minimum number of seats allocated to the coalition of parties that
received the largest number of votes).5 The majority premium was awarded on a national basis for
the Chamber of Deputies and region-by-region for the Senate.6
For this study, the most relevant difference between the two Houses of Parliament is the voting
4In addition to its 315 elected members, the Senate also has members with lifetime tenure, the so-called “senators
for life.” These include five senators appointed by the President of the Italian Republic “for outstanding merits in
the social, scientific, artistic or literary field,” plus former Presidents, who become senators for life ex officio. By
contrast, the Chamber of Deputies has no “deputies for life.” Henceforth, we talk interchangeably of the “Chamber of
Deputies”, the “House of Representatives”, and the “lower House”.
5In each multi-seat legislative district, parties ran with rosters of candidates. Because of the closed-list system,
voters could not express preferences over party candidates running in their district. Moreover, candidates could run in
multiple districts and they could choose, after the election, which district to be elected from. As such, it was extremely
difficult for a voter to predict the candidates her vote would contribute to elect.
6In the Chamber, the coalition of parties receiving the largest number of votes nationwide was awarded a share
of the available seats equal to the maximum between 54 percent and the sum of the vote shares of the parties in the
coalition. In the Senate, each of the 20 regions in the country awarded a different majority premium to the coalition of
parties receiving the largest vote share in that region. Relative to the Chamber of Representatives, the region-by-region
premium made it more challenging for coalitions of parties to win a majority of seats in the Senate. Consequently, two
of the three elections held with this system resulted in a hung Senate (2006 and 2013); that is, no coalition of parties
had a clear majority of Senate seats. This suggests the lack of turnout effects of Senate voting eligibility (Section 4.1)
is not driven by the Senate elections being inconsequential.
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age, which the Constitution sets at 18 for the Chamber of Deputies and at 25 for the Senate. During
parliamentary elections, every voter receives a ballot for the Chamber of Deputies, but only voters
25 or older also receive a ballot for the Senate.7 In Section 4.1, we use an RDD on voter-level data
to examine whether the discontinuous age-induced eligibility to vote for the Senate affects voter
participation. Importantly, by comparing turnout and voter behavior across the age discontinuity
within Parliamentary elections, the RDD holds the overall salience of the election constant, as
Italian parties do no target campaigns to individuals of different ages. Specifically, the additional
effort to acquire information to vote for the Senate might be small conditional on the decision to
vote for the Chamber of Deputies, especially given the closed-list electoral system in force between
2006 and 2013, under which voters could not express preferences over party candidates and the
same parties appeared on both the Chamber and Senate ballots. However, the marginal benefit of
Senate voting eligibility might be small too if, for example, voters perceive the two elections to be
about the same issue (e.g., the appointment of the executive branch of government that hinges on
the cross-party distribution of seats in the two Houses of Parliament).
The second source of variation used in the paper comes from the three levels of administrative
divisions in Italy: regions, provinces, and municipalities. The entire national territory is divided
into 15 ordinary and 5 special regions.8 The 20 regions are partitioned into 93 provinces, which, in
turn, are divided into municipalities. Since the Italian Parliament amended the country’s Constitu-
tion in 2001, the 15 ordinary regions have “residual” legislative powers; that is, they have exclusive
legislative jurisdiction with regard to any matters not explicitly reserved by the Constitution to the
national government. Italian regions also have important regulatory, administrative, and fiscal pow-
ers. By contrast, the powers of provinces are limited to minor aspects of zoning, the maintenance
of primary and secondary school facilities, and the maintenance of provincial roads. Similarly to
American cities and towns, Italian municipalities have broad powers over zoning regulations, pub-
7Italian elections rely on a traditional paper-ballot system. No registration is required to vote in Italy: individuals
are automatically registered to vote at pre-designated polling locations based on their residence. At the end of the
voting process, paper ballots are manually counted by election officials (Aldashev and Mastrobuoni, 2016). Except
for Italians living abroad, there is no absentee or early voting in Italy.
8Special regions have larger autonomy from the central government and additional legislative jurisdiction than their
ordinary counterparts.
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lic safety, waste management, local taxes, and roads.9 As shown in Figure 1, differences in powers
across levels of administrative divisions are reflected in differences in turnout rates.
Since 1993, voters have been electing the executive and legislative branches of regional, provin-
cial, and municipal governments, though, in 2011, provincial elections were abolished.10 Like
parliamentary and European elections, all local (i.e., sub-national) elections regularly follow a 5-
year calendar.11 In practice, though, several factors may shorten the term of local and national
legislatures, thereby resulting in early elections. Early municipal and regional elections are called
automatically in case of death, removal, resignation, or incapacitation of the mayor and governor,
respectively, and the same principle applied to province presidents.12 At the national level, the
President of the Republic can call a snap election following the resignation of the prime minister
or after ascertaining that the executive no longer has the support of the legislative (e.g., because one
of the Houses of Parliament passed a motion of no confidence). These fluctuations in election cal-
endars create within-city and within-Election-Day variation in the number and types of concurrent
elections. While these early elections might be correlated with voters’ sentiment affecting turnout,
subsequent concurrent elections due to these shifts are likely exogenous. In Section 4.3, we exploit
this variation using a DD design to estimate the effect of concurrent elections on turnout and valid
ballots cast, and we show that our results are robust to dropping the first instances of these calendar
shifts.
Voter turnout in Italy is higher than in the U.S. and most European countries, but it has been
experiencing a steady decline since the late 1970s (Figure 1). Participation is usually lower in
provincial than in regional, European, and municipal elections, and it is highest during national
9However, while cities and towns in the U.S. have considerable control over the administration and organization of
primary and secondary schools, in Italy most of these functions are delegated to the national government.
10The executive and legislative branches of the provincial government are now “indirectly” elected by the mayors
and city councilors of the municipalities that constitute the provincial territory.
11Provinces and municipalities originally followed 4-year electoral calendars, which were extended to 5 years start-
ing in 2000.
12After the death, removal, resignation, or incapacitation of a mayor, municipal elections are held at the earliest
Election Day set by the Ministry of Interior. That is, the Ministry of Interior sets a single Election Day a year for all
municipal elections to be held in the 15 ordinary regions (typically, a single day in March to June). If a mayor dies
or steps down after that date, municipal elections take place in the following calendar year. In the meantime, her/his
duties and responsibilities are passed to the deputy mayor or to an individual appointed by the central government,
depending on the exact cause of the elected mayor’s removal.
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parliamentary elections. We thus refer to elections as ranked in the following decreasing order of
salience: parliamentary, municipal, regional, European, and provincial.
3 Data
This project relies on administrative data as well as survey data we collected specifically for
this study: for the Senate-voting-age RDD, we use administrative data on voter-level turnout and
survey data on information acquisition and voting behavior; for the DD on concurrent elections,
we use administrative city-level data on turnout and valid votes cast.
We pool two administrative sources of voter-level turnout data.13 First, we use the Osservato-
rio Prospex sull’Astensionismo Elettorale (henceforth the Prospex data), which are administrative
turnout data at the individual level collected and digitized by the Italian research foundation Istituto
Cattaneo. The Prospex data are an unbalanced panel of approximately 140,000 voters from 100
Italian precincts, who were followed over regional and statewide elections held in 1994 through
2006. The sampling procedure used to construct the Prospex data ensures the sample is representa-
tive of the 1981 national population in terms of areas of residence and city size.14 Beside turnout,
the data contain basic voters’ socio-demographic characteristics, including: date of birth, gender,
municipality of residence, educational attainment, and occupation.15 Second, we complement the
Prospex data with administrative turnout information from the city of Bologna, in northern Italy
(henceforth the Bologna data). The Bologna data contain similar information as the Prospex data,
but cover different elections; that is, the 2004 and 2009 European elections, and the 2008 and 2013
parliamentary elections. For each of these elections, the sample consists of all Bologna voters who
were between 22 and 28 years old.16
13In Italy, the only official sources of turnout data are attendance sheets that are signed by election officers in charge
of identifying voters at polling stations. After the election, these sheets are transferred to a warehouse annexed to the
local courthouse.
14See http://www.cattaneo.org/activity/rete-prospex/ (in Italian) for more information on the Prospex
sample. Accessed: August 22, 2019.
15Until 2001, educational attainment and occupation were reported on official attendance sheets used for election
administration, albeit with a large share of missing values.
16To construct the Bologna data, we digitized all Bologna’s attendance sheets from the 2004, 2008, 2009, and
2013 elections. We then sent these data to the municipal statistical office, which matched them against administrative
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Table 1 reports summary statistics for the long version of the Prospex panel dataset (column
1), for the Bologna data (column 2), and the pooled Prospex and Bologna data (column 3). All
samples are restricted to parliamentary elections and only include voters aged 22–28 for ease of
comparison. Average turnout in the Prospex data is 88 percent, which is in line with the high
level of voter participation in Italy. Because the Bologna sample covers more recent, lower turnout
elections (2008 and 2013), average turnout is slightly lower in column 2 (78 percent). Educational
attainment and occupation are missing for more than 60 percent of voters in the Prospex data, and
they are never observed in the Bologna data. Consistently with the young age of these voters, only
4 percent of individuals in the Bologna data are married. 8 percent of voters in the Prospex data
live in the Emilia-Romagna region, whose capital is Bologna.17
To collect data on voter behavior and information, we administered an anonymous survey to
1,193 18-to-30-year-old voters outside 10 randomly selected polling stations in Bologna during
the February 24–25, 2013, parliamentary elections. Among others, we asked voters if they re-
called the names of House or Senate candidate(s) running in their district, which party they voted
for, how much time they spent acquiring political information before the election, and their level
of agreement with a series of statements on their turnout decision. The full text of the survey
and summary statistics of surveyed voters are reported in Appendix A.1. Summary statistics of
interviewed voters’ characteristics are reported in table A2.
The Italian Ministry of Interior provided city-level counts of all ballots, invalid ballots (i.e., the
sum of over- and under-votes), and valid ballots (i.e., total-minus-invalid ballots) cast in almost
every municipal, provincial, regional, European, House of Representatives, and Senate election
demographic data at the individual level. After matching, the municipality of Bologna sent us a file including the
turnout information and socio-demographic variables typically unreported in voter attendance sheets (e.g., marital
status, immigration status, position within the household). To balance confidentiality with our need to implement the
RDD around the 25-year-old discontinuity, the municipality of Bologna restricted the final sample to voters aged 22
to 28 in the four sampled elections.
17Appendix Table A1 shows that observable covariates in the pooled Prospex-Bologna data are balanced across
voters on the two sides of the Senate voting eligibility threshold. Specifically, the table reports coefficients from RD
regressions using voter characteristics (i.e., education, occupation, marital status, region of residence, and gender) as
placebo outcomes. Out of 21 coefficients, only two are significant at the 5-percent level, and one is significant at the
10-percent level. Once accounting for multiple inference using Anderson (2008)’s procedure, all coefficients fall short
of statistical significance.
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held in Italy between 1993 and 2015, inclusive.18 Summary statistics of city-level variables are
reported in table A3.19
4 Results
4.1 Senate Voting Eligibility Does Not Increase Turnout
We first examine the turnout effect of Senate voting eligibility. The parameter of interest is the
standard RD treatment effect at the Senate voting-age cutoff:
τ ≡ τ(agei = 25) = E [turnouti(1)− turnouti(0)|agei = 25] ,
where turnouti(1) and turnouti(0) denote voter i’s turnout when she can vote for both Houses
of Parliament or only the Chamber of Representatives, respectively. As usual in RD designs, τ
denotes a “local” treatment effect; that is, the average effect on individuals who are exactly 25 on
Election Day.
Table 2 reports non-parametric estimates of τ , p-values, and confidence intervals based on the
procedure developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014); Calonico, Cattaneo and Farrell
(2017). Column 1 displays results from a non-parametric RDD regression that only controls for the
running variable (i.e., age in days minus age in days of voters who are exactly 25 on Election Day).
Column 2 further controls for full sets of dummies for educational attainment, gender, occupation,
marital status, region of residence, and election year.20
18We distinguish between turnout and casting a valid ballot. With turnout, we mean the act of turning out on
Election Day, independently of whether the voter casts a valid ballot, a blank ballot (“undervote”), or a spoiled vote
(“overvote”). With valid ballots, we mean ballots that are correctly cast according to election rules and are thus
included in the final vote tally.
19Four special regions with incomplete municipal turnout data (Aosta Valley, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sicily, and
Trentino-Alto Adige) are excluded from all city-level samples and regressions. We similarly exclude a few observa-
tions with clear inconsistencies in the reported vote tallies (e.g., more ballots cast than registered voters). Because the
Ministry of Interior city-level data on provincial elections are available only in 2004 through 2011, we collected pre-
2004 and post-2011 calendars of provincial elections from wikipedia.it to construct the “concurrent-provincial-election
treatment” for these years.
20Notice that the optimal RD bandwidth changes when we include covariates, thus resulting in columns 1 and
2 having different sample sizes. In both columns, we implement the bias-corrected RD estimator using Calonico,
Cattaneo and Farrell (2017)’s rdrobust Stata routine. We use a local linear regression to construct the point estimator,
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Eligibility to vote for the Senate has no effect on turnout. The estimated treatment effect is a
small and insignificant −.1 percentage point (column 1). Robust 95-percent confidence intervals
are tightly centered around zero, ranging from −2.1 to +1.8 percentage points. The inclusion of
covariates in column 2 does not substantively affect the estimate (−.7 percentage point), though it
reduces precision slightly.21
Figure 2 documents the zero turnout effect graphically. The red line denotes a linear fit of
turnout on the running variable, estimated separately on each side of a ±968-day neighborhood
around the 25-year-old discontinuity, using a triangular kernel and the MSE-optimal bandwidth
from Table 2, column 1. The point cloud represents average turnout by bins of the running vari-
able, where the number of evenly-spaced bins is chosen following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik
(2015).22 The plot shows no discontinuity in average turnout across the two sides of the 25-year-
old discontinuity.
Despite the zero average effect, are there any voters who respond to Senate voting eligibility by
turning out with higher (or lower) probability? Table 3 shows that the answer is negative. Specif-
ically, the estimated turnout effect is centered around zero and insignificant even when we restrict
attention to voters living in northern (column 2) or southern regions (column 3), men (column 4) or
women (column 5), high-school and college graduates (column 6), and voters in more recent po-
litical elections (column 7). If information acquisition costs correlated negatively with education,
we would expect a positive turnout effect on highly educated individuals (column 6). We interpret
the lack of such effect as evidence against the hypothesis that information acquisition costs prevent
Senate voting eligibility from increasing turnout.23
a local quadratic for the bias correction, a triangular kernel, one common MSE-optimal bandwidth selector, and HC1
heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimator.
21In Table A4 we implement a DD exercise parallel to that of Section 4.3 using the voter-level data from ITANES
and Bologna. Specifically, we show that, in regional and parliamentary elections, the turnout effect of concurrent
municipal elections is similar across voters aged 18–30 and voters of all ages. Though most of these estimates fall
short of conventional levels of statistical significance, they suggest that the lack of turnout effects due to Senate voting
eligibility is not driven by idiosyncrasies of voters close to the Senate-voting-age threshold.
22We construct the RD plot using Calonico, Cattaneo and Farrell (2017) Stata rdplot routine.
23In Table 1, we focused on voters between 22 and 28 years of age to ease comparison across the Bologna and
Prospex data. However, RD regressions are not restricted to that age range; in practice, though, all but one optimal
bandwidths reported in Table 3 are.
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Further corroborating our null result, Appendix A.2 documents that the zero turnout effect is
stable and robust across alternative RDD bandwidths (Figure A3) and replacing the actual 25-
year-old cutoff with placebo age discontinuities (Figure A4). Similarly, we find a tight zero from
placebo RDDs of voter turnout in non-parliamentary elections (Figure A5), in which the 25-year-
old cutoff induces no discontinuity. For this placebo exercise, we use the 1995, 2000, and 2005
regional elections from the Prospex data, and the 2004 and 2009 European elections from the
Bologna data.
The zero effect of Senate voting eligibility on turnout admits at least two possibly complemen-
tary explanations. First, given the high importance of parliamentary elections, voters may face
a “salience ceiling.” That is, voters may perceive the election to the Chamber of Deputies as so
important, that there may be no room for the Senate election to further increase voters’ political
interest and turnout. This salience ceiling may be reinforced by voters conflating the House and
Senate ballots into a single issue, namely the appointment of the executive, nullifying any addi-
tional benefit of casting two ballots instead of one.24 Second, because Italian parties do no target
campaigns to different voters, our RDD holds the overall electoral salience constant. Thus, our
null finding suggests that concurrent elections increase turnout only when additional ballots bring
additional salience (e.g., more intense campaigns). This explanation comports with the null effect
of voting eligibility on knowledge about candidates that we report below.
4.2 Senate Voting Eligibility Does Not Increase Voter Information
Although we find no effect on turnout, it is possible that Senate voting eligibility affects the
quantity and type of information voters gather before the election, their voting behavior, and their
rationales for turning out on Election Day. To explore this possibility, we use the survey data we
collected in Bologna during the 2013 parliamentary election.
Table 4 shows that Senate voting eligibility has no effect on survey outcomes. Rows corre-
24Section 4.2 provides additional evidence that Senate voting eligibility does not increase voting costs, which could
counteract positive effects on turnout, and that voters perceive the Senate election as being (at least) as consequential
as the House election.
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spond to survey variables. For each outcome, columns 1 through 3 report summary statistics,
while columns 4, 5, 7, and 8 report, respectively, the estimated RD effect, robust p-value, band-
width, and sample size computed using Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) estimator. Column
6 reports False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values robust to multiple inference based on Anderson
(2008)’s procedure. Voters barely below and above the 25-year-old cutoff display, among others,
statistically indistinguishable probabilities to support the Democratic Party or the 5-Star Movement
(question Q4), same levels of agreement with statements on their turnout decisions (questions Q7
through Q13), and the same perceived importance of being eligible to vote for both Houses of Par-
liament as opposed to only the lower House (question Q22). Particularly, all respondents strongly
agree with statements like “Voting is important even if one ballot is inconsequential” (question Q9)
and “I am interested in politics also outside of election time” (question Q12), which suggests that
the number of ballots they are eligible to cast during parliamentary elections is irrelevant for their
decision to turn out.
Relative to their younger peers, voters 25 or older report spending marginally fewer hours
acquiring political information (question Q18) and are less likely to remember the name of a can-
didate running for the House of Representatives in their district (question Q2). At the same time,
however, we find no effect on the probability that voters correctly recall the name of a Senate
candidate (question Q3), or on the probability that knowing House or Senate candidate(s) affected
voting behavior (questions Q2 and Q3).25 Overall, voters who can vote for both Houses of Par-
liament acquire the same amount and type of information and display the same voting behavior as
their younger peers who cannot cast ballots for the Senate. This suggests that information costs
are not responsible for the lack of impact of Senate voting eligibility on turnout.26
As survey participation was voluntary, it is possible that the probability of answering the sur-
vey changes discontinuously across the 25-year-old threshold.27 To dismiss this concern, we use
25Moreover, after adjusting the p-values in Table 4 for multiple hypotheses testing, the negative effect of Senate
voting eligibility on knowing the name of a candidate running for the House of Representatives becomes insignificant.
26RD graphs for selected survey outcomes are reported in Figures A6 and A7.
27For example, this could be because people whose 25th birthday falls exactly on Election Day may be unwilling to
spend time answering a survey.
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the test described by Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2018, 2016) to check if the density of the run-
ning variable is continuous at the treatment cutoff. Because there should be the same number of
voters barely above and barely below the 25-year-old cutoff, in expectation, detecting a disconti-
nuity would suggest that the probability of answering the survey changes abruptly at the threshold.
The Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2016) test produces a p-value of .948, which reassures that the
probability of answering the survey is indeed continuous across the treatment cutoff.
Another concern is that the type of survey respondents may change discontinuously at the
cutoff. Assuaging this concern, Table A2 shows that observable voter characteristics are balanced
across the two sides of the discontinuity. Thus, the zero impact of Senate voting eligibility on
voter information and behavior is not driven by discontinuous changes in the population of survey
respondents.
4.3 Concurrent Elections Increase City-Level Turnout, Invalid Ballots, and Valid Ballots
We now examine the effect of concurrent elections on city-level outcomes in municipal, provin-
cial, regional, European, House of Representatives, and Senate elections. To estimate these im-
pacts, we run the following DD regression separately for each of the six election types mentioned
above:
yi,t = β mT mi,t +β
pT pp(i),t +β
rT rr(i),t +δi + γt + εi,t , (1)
where yi,t denotes one out of three possible outcomes: voter turnout (i.e., votes cast as a share
of a generic city i’s voters), the share of invalid ballots (i.e., the sum of over- and under-votes
divided by i’s voter counts), or the share of valid ballots (i.e., turnout minus invalid ballots).28
T mi,t , T
p
p(i),t , and T
r
r(i),t are dummies for whether city i held concurrent municipal, provincial, or
regional elections on Election Day t, respectively; δi and γt denote full sets of city and Election
Day fixed effects. Importantly, we estimate two types of turnout effects: the effect of high-salience
elections concurring with lower-salience ones and the effect of less-salient elections concurring
28The three outcomes share the same denominator to ease comparison of estimates from different models.
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with higher-salience contests.29
Identification in equation 1 requires within-city and within-Election Day variation. That is,
some cities must switch treatment status over time (i.e., they must be observed sometimes with,
and sometimes without concurrent elections), and some election days must feature both treated
and control cities.30 These switches in treatment status happen as a result of early elections. While
these early elections might be correlated with voters’ sentiment affecting turnout, subsequent con-
current elections due to these shifts are likely exogenous. Below, we show that our results are
robust to including or dropping these early elections from our sample. In these and all other city-
level regressions, observations are weighted by counts of eligible voters. To account for potential
serial correlation of regression residuals (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004), standard errors
are clustered by province. However, because provinces are nested within regions, this clustering
scheme may yield standard errors that, in the case of β r, are biased downwards. Thus, only for
β r, we report p-values from a post-estimation, wild-bootstrap procedure (Cameron, Gelbach and
Miller, 2008; Webb, 2014) instead of province-clustered standard errors. These p-values are ro-
bust to serial correlation within regions and to the possibility that we have too few clusters (i.e., 16
regions).31
Table 5 reports the main city-level impact estimates. Panels A through C report estimated
effects on turnout, invalid ballots, and valid ballots, respectively. Each column corresponds to a
different election type/sample. Control outcome means are computed using cities-election dates
without concurrent provincial, regional, or municipal elections.
Concurrent municipal elections have a sizable, positive effect on voter turnout (Panel A). This
effect is larger in lower-salience, lower-turnout elections, but remains positive and significant even
during parliamentary elections, which, on average, attract a larger share of the voting-age pop-
29In this section, we measure the salience of an election as average voter turnout absent concurrent elections. For
example, provincial elections are less salient than regional elections because, without concurrent elections, turnout in
the former is 59.2% vs. 66.9% in the latter (see Panel A in Table 5, columns 1 and 3).
30Because of the Election Day fixed effects, we cannot separately estimate the impact of concurrent elections that
take place on the same day in every municipality (i.e., European and parliamentary elections).
31Moreover, Appendix Tables A11 A12 show that patterns of significant effects from city-level DD regressions are
substantively unaffected by accounting for multiple hypotheses testing.
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ulation than municipal elections.32 By contrast, provincial elections significantly increase voter
turnout only when they concur with European (+3.9 percentage points) or municipal elections
(+.6 percentage points). Similarly, concurrent regional elections have a positive turnout effect
during European (+11.8 percentage points) and municipal elections (+1.6 percentage points),
though the paucity of clusters rules out clear-cut conclusions.
Positive effects on turnout are paralleled by positive effects on the number of invalid ballots cast
(Panel B), a phenomenon that admits at least two explanations. On the one hand, the concurrence
of multiple elections may confuse some voters, leading them to cast an invalid ballot by mistake.
On the other hand, some voters may be interested in and intentionally cast a valid ballot only for
the concurrent election.33
Panel C reports the net effect of higher turnout and more invalid ballots, namely effects on
valid ballots. In most cases, the increase in invalid ballots does not completely offset the impact on
turnout, so positive turnout effects translate to more valid ballots cast. However, this is not true for
some lower-salience elections concurring with higher-salience ones (e.g., provincial elections con-
curring with municipal ones in column 4, and municipal elections concurring with House or Senate
elections in columns 5 and 6), which feature zero effects on valid ballots cast despite positive and
significant effects on turnout. In these cases, identical increases in turnout and invalid ballots may
suggest that voters find the additional ballot worthless. Alternatively, voters interested primarily
in the low-salience election may face steep information acquisition costs for the higher-salience
election.
The asymmetry between the large impact of concurrent municipal elections on valid ballots cast
in provincial elections and the null effect of concurrent provincial elections on municipal outcomes
suggests that the dissimilarity between elections is not the most important factor affecting voting
behavior. Voters in the low-stake provincial elections would likely vote in municipal elections even
if these were held on a separate day. By contrast, voters in municipal elections are willing to cast
32Absent concurrent elections of other types, voter turnout in municipal elections is 70.8 percent (column 4), against
82.5 percent in parliamentary elections (column 5).
33A third possibility is that election officers put more effort into detecting invalid ballots when a low-salience
election coincides with a high-salience one (Aldashev and Mastrobuoni, 2016).
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the additional provincial ballot when the elections coincide, but would not go to the polls for the
provincial election alone. One potential explanation for this asymmetry is ideological voting; that
is, voting along party lines in different elections (thus reducing election-specific information ac-
quisition costs). Unfortunately, it is difficult to explore patterns of disjoint voting in Italy, because
most candidates in local elections run with local lists that are hard to classify according to the
national party system. Furthermore, the decision of subnational candidates to align with national
parties is endogenous to the political context (e.g., whether the ruling national party is popular or
not; Daniele, Galletta and Geys, 2020). Consequently, it is difficult to predict ex ante how the
turnout effects of election concurrency may affect which party wins second-order elections.
4.4 City-Level Placebo Tests
In the online appendix, we perform two tests of the “parallel-trends” assumption underlying
regression 1. In Table A5, we implement a test of Granger causality (Granger, 1969). The idea
is to see whether causes happen before consequences, and not vice versa. Specifically, we test
whether, conditional on current treatment status, future concurrent elections have no impact on
electoral outcomes today. It would be heartening to find that treatment status has no (partial)
explanatory power on current outcomes, while finding otherwise may signal that treated and control
municipalities are on different time trends.
Reassuringly, future treatment status has little to no partial predictive power on present electoral
outcomes. Virtually all impact estimates in Table A5 are smaller in both magnitude and statistical
significance than corresponding estimates from Table 5. This is particularly evident for concur-
rent municipal elections, which have sizable and significant effects on almost every outcome and
in every sample of Table 5, but whose future realizations exhibit puny and mostly insignificant
correlations with present electoral outcomes. A handful of impact estimates reach conventional
levels of statistical significance. However, in all but one such cases, a test of joint insignificance
fails to reject the null hypothesis of zero partial correlation between future concurrent elections
and present outcomes.
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In Table A6, we test whether our results are driven by the specific instances causing changes
in municipal election calendars (i.e., by early municipal elections caused by the mayor’s death or
resignation). To do so, we exclude election dates coinciding with early municipal elections from
all samples/columns. For every city, we identify early municipal elections as municipal elections
that take place within four years or fewer since earlier elections of the same type.34 All estimates
are substantively identical to the ones in Table 5. That is, our results are not driven by voter turnout
responses to the events that cause early municipal elections.
4.5 The Effects of Concurrent Elections Are Concentrated in Southern Municipalities
Due to its long history of political fragmentation, Italy is characterized by substantial geo-
graphic heterogeneity in economic development and social capital (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales,
2004). Several studies find that the high degree of geographic variation in social capital translates
to important differences in terms of voter behavior. For example, Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti
(1994) find that high levels of membership in local associations strengthen the ties between polit-
ical parties and voters in the North of Italy, which contrasts with mostly clientelistic relationships
in the South. Nannicini et al. (2013) show that higher levels of social capital correspond to better
political accountability. Using a sample of municipal elections in Italy, De Benedetto and De Paola
(2016) argue that the strength of the clientelistic relationship between incumbent mayoral candi-
dates and voters explains the positive (negative) effect of incumbency on turnout that the authors
observe in regions with low (high) levels of social capital. Table 6 shows that southern regions
are characterized by lower turnout across all election types. Thus, understanding what policies
could reduce disparities in political participation across regions may contribute to the study of
democracies with (quasi-)federalist institutions like Italy.
We now examine whether concurrent elections have stronger effects in southern regions, which
are characterized by lower levels of economic development and social capital than northern regions.
For each election type in our sample, we estimate DD regression 5 separately for municipalities in
34Because municipal elections were held on four-year calendars until 1999, we use three years or fewer for munici-
pal elections held between 1993 and 1999.
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northern and southern regions. Table 6 reports impact estimates on turnout in northern (panel A)
and southern regions (panel B).35
Turnout effects of concurrent elections are larger in southern than northern municipalities. This
holds true across election types (columns) and for different types of concurrent elections (rows).
Particularly when local elections concur with nationwide parliamentary or European ones, turnout
effects in southern municipalities are an order of magnitude larger than in the Center-North. For in-
stance, concurrent regional elections increase turnout in European elections by 24 and 3.5 percent-
age points in southern and northern municipalities, respectively. Similarly, coinciding provincial
elections raise parliamentary-election turnout by 5.6 percentage points in southern municipalities
and reduce it by −.8 percentage point in the Center-North. Interestingly, lower-salience elections
in the South increase turnout even when they concur with higher-salience contests. For example,
provincial, regional, and municipal elections increase turnout in House elections by 5.6, 11.5, and
6.6 percentage points, respectively.
Stronger turnout effects in the South (and, more broadly, in areas with lower-than-average
turnout36) are consistent with the “ceiling effect” of salience being less binding in low-turnout ar-
eas. That is, adding concurrent elections in the North may be relatively ineffective at enhancing
turnout, because most northern voters already vote in most elections, particularly in high-salience
parliamentary ones. By contrast, the margins for increasing political interest (hence, voter turnout)
in the South may be wider, leaving more space for concurrent elections to increase political partici-
pation. In this case, our heterogeneous analysis suggests that the turnout benefits from aggregating
multiple elections on a single Election Day may be larger in areas characterized by relatively low
levels of voter mobilization.37
35Because effects on invalid and valid ballots largely follow the patterns of turnout impact estimates, we report them
in Appendix Tables A7 and A8.
36Of course, southern and norther regions differ across many dimensions, including average educational attainment
and income. Indeed, heterogeneity of turnout impact estimates along these two dimensions (in Appendix Tables A9
and A10, respectively) is largely consistent with the one between northern and southern regions.
37An alternative explanation might point to the greater role of public sector employment in the South of Italy,




Our empirical findings suggest that the literature should pay more attention to how individual
voters respond to the effects of concurrency. To formalize this idea, here we outline a simple the-
oretical framework building on Aldrich, 1993’s discussion of the rational choice model of voting.
Our model posits that voters who turn out on Election Day face two types of voting costs and
benefits. First, there are voting costs and benefits that are “fixed,” in that they do not depend on
the number of ballots voters can cast at the voting booth. The opportunity cost of reaching one’s
polling station is an example of a fixed voting cost, while adherence to social norms may represent
an example of a fixed voting benefit. Second, there are ballot-specific voting costs (e.g., the cost
of acquiring information about candidates running in a specific race) and benefits (e.g., the utility
gain of marginally increasing the preferred candidate’s victory probability in a specific race).
Formally, we model a generic voter i’s (i) decision to turn out on Election Day and, conditional
on turning out, (ii) to cast a valid (instead of a blank) ballot for the K separate elections held on that
day. If voter i casts a set M 6= /0, |M|= M ≤K of valid ballots, she incurs a fixed cost Fi to go to the
voting booth, as well as ballot-specific costs Cik, k ∈M (e.g., endogenous information acquisition
costs). By contrast, the ballot-specific cost of casting a blank ballot is zero (i.e., Cik = 0, ∀k ∈MC).
Under these assumptions, concurrent elections never decrease turnout, as the voter has the option
to ignore the concurrent election and cast a blank ballot.
Similarly, voter i derives positive utility Bi from turning out, independently of the ballots she
casts, and a ballot-specific expected benefit Bik from casting a valid ballot in election k. Bi can
be interpreted as the utility from conforming to social norms (Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006) or
social pressure (Funk, 2010). Following Riker and Ordeshook (1968), the expected benefit is equal
to the utility gain from casting the decisive vote in favor of one’s preferred candidate in election
k, pikbik, plus a utility term that is independent of the election outcome, Dik. In this paper, we
focus on the nature of ballot-specific costs and benefits and on their interactions. For simplicity,
we assume pivotal probabilities (and, thus, pikbik) to be negligible (e.g., Coate, Conlin and Moro,
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2008; Enos and Fowler, 2014; Feddersen, 2004). Blank ballots induce no ballot-specific benefits;
that is bik = 0, ∀k ∈MC.
Voter i casts a set M 6= /0 of ballots on Election Day if her indirect utility evaluated at M is
weakly positive. That is:
Vi(M) = δiDi− γiCi +Bi−Fi ≥ 0, (2)
where Di and Ci are M× 1 vectors denoting the benefits and costs of the M ballots cast by i,
respectively, while δ and γ are M×M matrices of weakly positive weights (with main-diagonal
terms equal to 1) that allow these costs and benefits to vary depending on the combination of
concurring elections.
This flexible description of a voter’s utility illustrates that the turnout effect of holding multiple
elections concurrently depends on the nature of these elections. Specifically, we discuss four cases.
Importantly, these cases are not mutually exclusive and the net effect of concurrent elections will
depend on the relative magnitude of the individual benefits, costs, and weights.
– γ jk ≤ 1: subadditive voting costs. The concurrence of election j weakly decreases the
marginal cost of voting in election k. This case could arise from economies of scope in
acquiring information for elections j and k. For example, concurrent elections that feature
the same parties or similar issues might increase turnout and the number of valid ballots
more than elections with different focuses.
– γ jk > 1: superadditive voting costs. The concurrence of election j increases the marginal
cost of voting in election k. For example, voter fatigue may cause marginal voting costs to
increase in the number of ballots voters cast on Election Day. With superadditive voting
costs, concurrent elections might increase turnout less among individuals with lower cogni-
tive ability.
– δ jk < 1: subadditive voting benefits. The concurrence of election j decreases the marginal
benefit of voting in election k. For example, Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008); Funk (2010);
Dellavigna et al. (2017) show that social pressure is a crucial driver of voter turnout. If
turnout is just a response to social pressure, the presence of concurrent elections may gen-
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erate limited additional benefits to voters, and turnout may not increase. However, social
pressure might be stronger when multiple elections are held together. For example, an in-
dividual might be asked about her voting behavior in each election. In that case, theories
of turnout that rely on social pressure might be consistent superaddivite voting benefits (i.e.,
δ jk ≥ 1).
– δ jk ≥ 1: superadditive voting benefits. The concurrence of election j weakly increases the
marginal benefit of voting in election k. For example, voters could derive additional benefits
from electing officials at different levels (e.g., municipal, regional, and national) if these
officials jointly shape public policy. Alternatively, voters could derive extra utility from
split-ticket voting (i.e., voting for a candidate from one party in one election and a candidate
from another party in the other election; e.g., Chari, Jones and Marimon, 1997).
The magnitude of the ballot-specific benefits and costs determines the impact of adding a particular
ballot to Election Day. The more salient an election—that is, the higher the net benefit—the more
it can increase turnout in a low-salience election. Whether those additional ballots will be valid
or invalid depends on the similarity of concurring elections and on the other factors described
above.38
In summary, our stylized model posits that the interaction between ballot-specific voting costs
and benefits drives the turnout effect of holding multiple elections concurrently. The higher the
salience of an election, that is its specific benefit, the more it increases turnout when it concurs with
a low-salience election. Yet, whether higher turnout translates to more valid votes (instead of blank
ballots) depends on the similarity of the information acquisition process across concurrent elections
and on the relative importance of ballot-specific benefits versus benefits that are independent of the
38Equation 2 models an individual voter’s decision to cast a ballot. However, in the DD analysis in Section 4.3, we
use city-level data. The concurrence of elections j and k raises city-level turnout in election k if, and only if, it increases
the number of voters receiving positive indirect utility. With concurring election j, individuals with subadditive costs
(resp. superadditive benefits) vote more numerously in election k, while individuals with superadditive costs (resp.
subadditive benefits) prefer to abstain (i.e., cast a blank ballot) in election k. To derive meaningful predictions, we
need these countervailing effects not to cancel out in the aggregate. To interpret our findings, we make the somewhat
restrictive assumption that all voters share the same weighting matrices δ and γ . Importantly, this assumption still
allows heterogeneity across voters in ballot-specific costs and benefits Di and Ci, such as information acquisition
costs, while imposing the same behavioral model on the whole population.
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number of Election Day ballots (e.g., adherence to social norms).
This framework helps to rationalize some of our findings. In the voter-level RDD, the zero
effects of Senate voting eligibility on voter turnout and information suggest that voters perceive
the House and Senate elections to be about a single issue (i.e., the identity of the cabinet that
will be eventually appointed by the President of the Republic). This conflation likely nullifies
the marginal benefit of casting the Senate ballot, conditional on already voting for the House of
Representatives. In the city-level DD, high-salience (e.g., municipal) elections increase turnout
and valid ballots cast in lower-salience (e.g., provincial) elections, thus suggesting that marginal
information acquisition costs are relatively small. Small marginal costs are consistent with Italians
voting ideologically along party lines across ballots. In our model, this would translate to a high
information acquisition cost for the first ballot, to learn about parties’ platforms or ideologies, and
a negligible marginal cost for additional ballots.
6 Conclusion
We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections on political participation using
Italian administrative and survey data. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the number and
type of choices Italian voters face on Election Day. Individual-level RDDs show that becoming
eligible to vote for the Senate at age 25 has no impact on voter turnout or knowledge about can-
didates. We also estimate city-level DD models showing that concurrent high-salience elections
increase turnout in lower-salience “second-order” elections, but not vice-versa. Moreover, concur-
rency effects are concentrated in municipalities in the South of Italy, a region with relatively weak
political parties and low levels of social capital.
Our precise null RDD findings provide individual-level evidence that the mobilizing effect
of concurrency are highly dependent on the political context. Because the salience of elections
to the Lower House of the Italian Parliament is already high, eligibility to vote in another high
salience election may not raise turnout if electoral campaigns do not micro-target their efforts to
mobilize voters – as evidenced by the equal levels of information about candidates to the Upper
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House among voters just below the age threshold. These findings comport with recent work in the
American context showing that the effects of election timing on the composition of the electorate
depend on voter mobilization efforts by political parties and interest groups (Anzia, 2011; Kogan,
Lavertu and Peskowitz, 2018).
Our city-level DD findings indicate that the effects of concurrency on turnout tend to be
stronger in contexts where the level of party mobilization is lower, like the South of Italy. This
contributes to explaining the sources of heterogeneity in the effects of holding multiple elections
concurrently (Geys, 2006). Interestingly, we also find that concurrency (slightly) increases the
number of invalid ballots cast, thus suggesting a trade-off between the mobilizing effects of hold-
ing multiple elections concurrently and the risk of “choice fatigue” (Augenblick and Nicholson,
2016; Garmann, 2017).
In all, our results suggest that, although concurrent elections are no panacea for stopping the
turnout hemorrhage observed in many democracies, they can certainly be a partial remedy in some
circumstances. For example, organizing low-salience regional elections on the same day as high-
salience municipal elections generally seems like a good idea, given that low levels of participation
in regional elections may undermine the legitimacy of (quasi-)federalist institutions. However, our
findings also suggest that the turnout effects of holding second-order elections on-cycle are often
constrained by a “salience ceiling”, which depends on the political and social context, as well as by
the prevalence of ideological voting, which might lower information acquisition costs. Finally, our
study is mostly silent about the consequences of concurrency for who wins elections and resulting
policy outcomes (Kogan, Lavertu and Peskowitz, 2018; Lo Prete and Revelli, 2020), though our
RDD results indicate that expanding Senate voting eligibility to 18-24 year-olds would be unlikely
to raise the relatively low levels of participation among this age-group.
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Notes: The figure plots average turnout by election type and year using official tallies from the
Ministry of the Interior.
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Notes: The red line denotes a linear fit of voter-level turnout on the age-based running variable,
estimated separately on each side of a ±968-day neighborhood around the 25-year-old Senate
voting-eligibility discontinuity, using a triangular kernel and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from
Table 2, column 1. The point cloud represents average turnout by bins of the running variable,
where the number of equally-spaced bins is chosen following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik
(2015).
28
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Voter-Level Samples
Sample: Prospex Bologna Pooled
(1) (2) (3)
Age 25.1 25.2 25.2
(1.7) (1.7) (1.7)
Voted .875 .777 .815
Election year:
1994 .187 .000 .073
1996 .252 .000 .099
2001 .376 .000 .147
2006 .185 .000 .072
2008 .000 .512 .312
2013 .000 .488 .298
Education (1996):
Missing .625 1.000 .853
Illiterate .003 .000 .001
Elementary school .022 .000 .009
Middle school .260 .000 .101
High school .085 .000 .033
College .005 .000 .002
Occupation (1996):
Missing or unemployed .681 1.000 .875
Agricultural worker .006 .000 .002
Blue-collar worker .050 .000 .019
Artisan .023 .000 .009
Retail worker .010 .000 .004
White-collar worker (low level .015 .000 .006
White-collar worker (mid level .031 .000 .012
White-collar worker (high level .004 .000 .002
Homemaker or Retiree .026 .000 .010
Student .154 .000 .060
Marital status:
Missing 1.000 .002 .392
Single, divorced or widowed .000 .959 .584
Married .000 .040 .024
Lives in Emilia-Romagna .075 1.000 .639
Female .486 .485 .486
N 20,081 31,323 51,404
Notes:  The table reports means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses, only for non-binary variables) of voter 
characteristics.  Samples in columns 1 and 2 are restricted to the 
Prospex and Bologna data, respectively.  Summary statistics in 
column 3 are from the pooled Prospex and Bologna sample.  All 
samples are restricted to parliamentary elections (i.e., 1994, 
1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, and 2013) and to voters aged 22 to 28.  
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Table 2: Turnout Effect of Senate Voting Eligibility
(1) (2)
1(age  25) -.001 -.006
Robust p-value .975 .390
Robust CI95% [-.020, .019] [-.032, .012]
Outcome mean (age < 25) .822 .818
Covariates No Yes
Bandwidth (days) 1,937 1,403
N 45,227 32,624
Voter-Level Turnout
Notes:  The table reports the estimated turnout effect of 
Senate voting eligibility (i.e., of a voter being 25 or 
older on the day of a parliamentary election) in the 
pooled Prospex-Bologna sample.  All estimates are from 
local linear regressions based on Calonico et al. (2014) 
optimal bandwidth selector with HC1 heteroskedasticity-
robust variance estimator.  Column 2 controls for full 
sets of educational attainment, gender, occupation, 
marital status, region, and year dummies.  
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
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Table 3: Turnout Effect of Senate Voting Eligibility: Heterogeneity
 '06, '08,
Sample: Full Sample North South Men Women and '13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1(age  25) -.001 -.007 .023 .013 -.012 .008 -.005
Robust p-value .975 .386 .359 .298 .485 .909 .540
Robust CI95% [-.020, .019] [-.033, .013] [-.027, .073] [-.013, .044] [-.032, .015] [-.048, .053] [-.034, .018]
Outcome mean (age < 25) .822 .822 .822 .822 .824 .822 .823
Bandwidth (days) 1,937 1,675 1,663 1,858 2,326 1,653 2,031
N 45,227 33,579 5,443 22,262 26,525 3,110 32,426
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
Notes:  Each column reports the estimated turnout effect of Senate voting eligibility (i.e., of a voter being 25 or older on 
the day of a parliamentary election) in a specific sample.  Column 1 uses the entire pooled Prospex-Bologna sample and 
is identical to Column 1 of Table 2.  Samples of columns 2 and 3 are restricted to voters living in northern and southern 
regions (Sardinia and Siciliy, inclusive), respectively. Samples of columns 4 and 5 are restricted to male and female 
voters, respectively. The sample of column 6 is restricted to voters with at least a high-school diploma.  The sample of 
column 7 is restricted to the 2006, 2008, and 2013 parliamentary elections.  All estimates are from local linear 






Table 4: Survey Data: Voting Behavior and Information Acquisition
Sample Sample RDD Robust FDR Bwidth RDD
Mean St. Dev. N Estimate p-value q-value (Days) N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Correctly names House candidate(s)? (Q2) .210 .408 1,193 -.383 .007 .142 880 214
Correctly names Senate candidate(s)? (Q3) .083 .276 1,193 .010 .860 1.000 1,292 318
Knowing House candidate(s) affected voting behavior? (Q2) .102 .303 1,193 -.106 .219 1.000 1,394 340
Knowing Senate candidate(s) affected voting behavior? (Q3) .029 .169 1,193 -.079 .229 1.000 1,288 317
Voted Democratic Party for House? (Q4) .194 .396 1,193 -.075 .748 1.000 1,009 243
Voted 5-Star Movement for House? (Q4) .143 .351 1,193 .101 .256 1.000 1,102 270
Electoral system affected voting behavior? (Q6) .122 .327 1,193 .036 .861 1.000 1,741 427
Disagree (= 1) or Agree (= 5):
Possibility of a tie affected turnout (Q7) 2.27 1.49 1,186 -.17 .758 1.000 1,224 296
Convenience of voting affected turnout (Q8) 1.91 1.34 1,184 .05 .814 1.000 1,386 335
Voting is important even if one ballot is inconsequential (Q9) 4.80 .65 1,186 .01 .780 1.000 1,289 316
Also voted to be seen by friends, acquaintances (Q10) 1.21 .69 1,184 .03 .862 1.000 1,453 351
Voted because like-minded people could not turn out (Q11) 1.81 1.22 1,184 .16 .491 1.000 1,818 445
Interested in politics outside election time (Q12) 3.51 1.25 1,186 -.54 .132 1.000 1,094 270
Had to give up something to vote (e.g., travel, leisure) (Q13) 1.46 1.06 1,184 .12 .843 1.000 1,320 322
Minutes spent to vote? (Q17) 15.7 57.1 1,180 -5.7 .353 1.000 865 208
Minutes willing to spend to vote? (Q18) 246 373 1,167 18 .635 1.000 1,246 303
Hours/week spent acquiring political info? (Q19) 5.02 5.18 1,164 -2.60 .073 1.000 1,184 284
Importance of voting for Senate & House vs. House only 3.42 1.23 1,155 -.35 .176 1.000 1,319 317
(1 = less important, 5 more than twice as important) (Q22)
Notes:  Each row reports summary statistics (columns 1-3) and RDD results (columns 4-8) of a different voter variable from 
Bologna's survey data.  RDD estimates (column 4), p-values (column 5), and bandwidths (column 7) are from local linear 
regressions based on Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth selector with HC1 heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimator.  
Column 6 reports False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values robust to multiple hypotheses testing based on Anderson (2008)'s 
procedure.  
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
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Table 5: Effect of Concurrent Elections on Turnout, Invalid Ballots, and Valid Ballots
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election) - .039 ** .020 .006 ~ -.004 -.004
- (.010) (.014) (.004) (.015) (.014)
1(concurrent regional election) -.011 .118 - .016 .002 .005
-
1(concurrent municipal election) .118 ** .099 ** .070 ** - .031 ** .030 **
(.007) (.007) (.009) - (.008) (.009)
Joint test p-value .000 .000 .000 .716 .001 .004
Control outcome mean .591 .639 .669 .708 .825 .824
N 18,342 35,343 32,542 38,079 42,423 42,432
1(concurrent provincial election) - .018 ** .001 .005 ** .001 .002
- (.003) (.006) (.001) (.003) (.002)
1(concurrent regional election) .007 .033 - .004 .014 .014
-
1(concurrent municipal election) .027 ** .027 ** .022 ** - .029 ** .025 **
(.002) (.003) (.004) - (.004) (.004)
Joint test p-value .000 .000 .000 .037 .000 .000
Control outcome mean .013 .032 .045 .028 .041 .042
N 18,342 35,343 32,542 38,079 42,423 42,432
1(concurrent provincial election) - .021 ** .019 .001 -.005 -.005
- (.008) (.013) (.004) (.013) (.013)
1(concurrent regional election) -.018 .086 - .011 -.012 -.010
-
1(concurrent municipal election) .090 ** .072 ** .048 ** - .002 .005
(.007) (.005) (.008) - (.005) (.006)
Joint test p-value .001 .000 .000 .822 .949 .784
Control outcome mean .578 .607 .623 .680 .785 .782
N 18,342 35,343 32,542 38,079 42,423 42,432
Notes:  The table reports estimated effects of concurrent provincial, regional, and municipal elections on 
turnout (Panel A), invalid votes (Panel B), and valid votes (Panel C).  Each column represents a different 
election sample.  All regressions are weighted by voter counts and control for election round (i.e., first 
round or runoff; only relevant for provincial and municipal elections), day of the election, and city fixed 
effects.  Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses.  P-values robust to 
clustering at the region level, reported in braces, are computed with a 10,000-replication wild bootstrap 
using Webb (2014) weights.  P-values of joint insignificance are robust to clustering at the province level. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
A. City-Level Turnout
B. (Under- and Over-Votes)/Voters
C. Valid Votes/Voters




{.908} {.521} {.781} {.881}
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Table 6: Effect of Concurrent Elections on Turnout: North vs. South
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election) - .010 ** -.001 .004 -.008 ~ -.008 ~
- (.004) (.008) (.003) (.005) (.004)
1(concurrent regional election) - .035 - .016 -.009 -.006
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .116 ** .083 ** .043 ** - .009 ** .007 *
(.008) (.006) (.004) - (.003) (.003)
Control outcome mean .595 .693 .689 .708 .861 .859
N 13,042 24,510 24,020 25,991 29,430 29,437
1(concurrent provincial election) - .087 ** .035 ** .003 .056 ** .057 *
- (.012) (.005) (.005) (.022) (.023)
1(concurrent regional election) - .240 - .009 .115 .116
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .113 ** .173 ** .104 ** - .066 ** .067 **
(.015) (.012) (.011) - (.004) (.005)
Control outcome mean .583 .521 .610 .707 .752 .748
N 5,300 10,833 8,522 12,088 12,993 12,995
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
A. Northern and Central Regions
Notes:  The table reports estimated effects of concurrent provincial, regional, and municipal elections on 
turnout in Northern (Panel A) and Southern regions (Panel B).  Each column represents a different election 
sample.  All regressions are weighted by voter counts and control for election round (i.e., first round or 
runoff; only relevant for provincial and municipal elections), day of the election, and city fixed effects.  
Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses.  P-values robust to clustering 
at the region level, reported in braces, are computed with a 10,000-replication wild bootstrap using Webb 




{.956} {.868} {.128} {.154}
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A.1 Voter-Level Survey
Figure A1: Voter-Level Survey (Original Version, in Italian)
0) SESSO? a) UOMO  b) DONNA 
1) QUAL E’ LA TUA DATA DI NASCITA (GG/MM/AA)? 
 |__|__|/|__|__|/|__|__| 
 
2) CONOSCI IL NOME DI UNO O PIU’ CANDIDATI ALLA CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI NELLA TUA CIRCOSCRIZIONE ELETTORALE? 
a) SI’  b) NO  passa alla domanda 3 
2bis) SE SI’, CHI? 
 _________________________________  _________________________________  _________________________________  
2ter) 
SE SI’, IL FATTO CHE QUESTE PERSONE FOSSERO CANDIDATE ALLA CAMERA HA INFLUITO SULLA TUA DECISIONE AD ANDARE A VOTARE (A PRESCINDERE DA CHI TU ABBIA VOTATO) O CI SARESTI ANDATO IN OGNI CASO? 
a) SI’  b) NO 
3) CONOSCI IL NOME DI UNO O PIU’ CANDIDATI AL SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA NELLA TUA CIRCOSCRIZIONE ELETTORALE?  
a) SI’  b) NO  passa alla domanda 4 
 3bis) 
 SE SI’, CHI?  
 _________________________________  _________________________________  _________________________________  
3ter) 
SE SI’, IL FATTO CHE QUESTE PERSONE FOSSERO CANDIDATE AL SENATO HA INFLUITO SULLA TUA DECISIONE AD ANDARE  A VOTARE (A PRESCINDERE DA CHI TU ABBIA VOTATO) O CI SARESTI ANDATO IN OGNI CASO? 
a) SI’   b) NO 
4) PER QUALE PARTITO HAI VOTATO ALLA CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI? OPPURE: HAI VOTATO SCHEDA BIANCA? SCHEDA NULLA? NON HAI RITIRATO LA SCHEDA? (-999 se rifiuta di rispondere) 
  _________________________________  
5) 
PER QUALE PARTITO HAI VOTATO AL SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA? 
OPPURE: HAI VOTATO SCHEDA BIANCA? SCHEDA NULLA? NON HAI 
RITIRATO LA SCHEDA? (scrivere -888 se N/A perché minore di 25 
anni, -999 se rifiuta di rispondere) 
 _________________________________ 
6) IL MECCANISMO DI DISTRIBUZIONE DEI SEGGI PREVISTO DALLA LEGGE CALDEROLI HA INFLUENZATO IL TUO COMPORTAMENTO DI VOTO? 
a) SI’ 
 b) NO  passa alla domanda 7 
6bis) SE SI’, IN CHE MODO? 
  _________________________________  _________________________________  _________________________________  
1
Per ciascuna delle seguenti affermazioni, indica quanto sei d’accordo in una scala da 1 (“Per niente d’accordo”) a 5 (“Del tutto d’accordo”) 
Scala di importanza 
Per niente d’accordo 
Non molto d’accordo 
Né in disaccordo né d’accordo 
Abbastanza d’accordo Del tutto d’accordo 
 1 2 3 4 5 
7) Per decidere se andare a votare o astenerti, hai considerato anche la probabilità di un pareggio tra due o più partiti    
   
8) Per decidere se andare a votare o astenerti, la facilità e il breve tempo con cui è possibile votare hanno giocato un ruolo rilevante   
   




10) Sei andata/o a votare anziché astenerti anche perché volevi che persone che ti conoscono vedessero che andavi a votare   
   
11) Sei andata/o a votare perché pensi che altre persone che avrebbero votato come te non hanno potuto per varie ragioni   
   
12) La politica ti interessa anche al di fuori della campagna elettorale   
   
13) Per votare hai dovuto rinunciare a qualcosa (viaggio, riposo, svago)   
   
14) RICOPRI O HAI RICOPERTO RUOLI “ISTITUZIONALI” (RAPPRESENTANTE DI CLASSE O D’ISTITUTO A SCUOLA, DI CONDOMINIO, O ALTRO)? 
a) SI’  b) NO 
15) HAI VOTATO ANCHE ALLE SCORSE ELEZIONI COMUNALI (15-16 MAGGIO 2011)? 
a) SI’  b) NO 
16) HAI VOTATO ANCHE ALLE ELEZIONI POLITICHE DEL 2008? a) SI’            c) N/A se allora non 18enne  b) NO 
17) 
QUANTO TEMPO HAI DEDICATO AL VOTO (PER ESEMPIO, ANDARE AL SEGGIO, FARE LA FILA, ECC.)? NON CONTARE IL TEMPO DEDICATO AD ATTIVITA’ CHE AVRESTI FATTO ANCHE SE NON CI FOSSERO STATE LE ELEZIONI 
  _________ Minuti 
18) QUANTO TEMPO AL MASSIMO SARESTI STATO DISPOSTO A IMPEGNARE PER VOTARE (PER ESEMPIO, PER ANDARE AL SEGGIO, FARE LA FILA, ECC.)?  _________ Minuti 
19) QUANTO TEMPO IN UNA SETTIMANA TIPO DEDICHI A INFORMARTI DI POLITICA (GIORNALI, WEB, TV, RADIO, ECC.)? 
 _________ Ore 
20) QUAL E’ IL PIU’ ALTO GRADO DI ISTRUZIONE CHE HAI FINORA CONSEGUITO? 
a) Licenza media o meno (incluso 3 anni di scuola professionale) b) Diploma di scuola superiore (5 anni) c) Laurea triennale d) > Laurea triennale 
21) QUAL E’ LA TUA FASCIA DI REDDITO ANNUO LORDO (ESCLUDENDO IL REDDITO PERCEPITO DAI TUOI GENITORI, PARTNER, ECC)? 
a) 10 000 € o meno (incluso no reddito) b) (10 000 €, 20 000 €] c) (20 000 €, 30 000 €] d) (30 000 €, 50 000 €] e) Più di 50 000 € 
22) QUANTO PENSI CHE SIA PIU’ IMPORTANTE POTER VOTARE SIA ALLA CAMERA SIA AL SENATO RISPETTO A POTER VOTARE SOLO ALLA CAMERA? 
a) Meno importante b) Più importante ma meno di due volte più importante c) Due volte più importante d) Più di due volte più importante 
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Figure A2: Voter-Level Survey (English Version)
0) GENDER? a) MALE  b) FEMALE 
1) WHAT IS YOUR BIRTHDATE (DAY/MONTH/YEAR)? 
 |__|__|/|__|__|/|__|__| 
 
2) DO YOU KNOW THE NAME OF ONE OR MORE INDIVIDUALS RUNNING FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN YOUR DISTRICT? 
a) YES  b) NO  go to question 3 
2bis) IF SO, WHAT IS/ARE THEIR NAME(S)? 
 _________________________________  _________________________________  _________________________________  
2ter) 
IF SO, DID THE FACT THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE RUNNING FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESESENTATIVES HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON YOUR DECISION TO GO TO THE POLLS (REGARDLESS OF WHICH PARTY YOU CAST YOUR VOTE FOR) OR YOU WOULD HAVE VOTED ANYWAY? 
a) YES    a) NO 
3) DO YOU KNOW THE NAME OF ONE OR MORE INDIVIDUALS RUNNING FOR THE SENATE IN YOUR DISTRICT?  
a) YES  b) NO  go to question 4 
 3bis)  IF SO, WHAT IS/ARE THEIR NAME(S)? 
 _________________________________  _________________________________  _________________________________  
3ter) 
IF SO, DID THE FACT THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE RUNNING FOR THE SENATE HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON YOUR DECISION TO GO TO THE POLLS (REGARDLESS OF WHICH PARTY YOU CAST YOUR VOTE FOR) OR YOU WOULD HAVE VOTED ANYWAY? 
a) YES   b) NO 
4) WHICH PARTY DID YOU VOTE FOR AT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES? 
  _________________________________  
5) WHICH PARTY DID YOU VOTE FOR AT THE SENATE? (write -888 if N/A because younger than 25)  _________________________________ 
6) 
DID THE ELECTORAL RULE (“Calderoli Law”, ie the so-called porcellum) THAT “TRANSLATES” BALLOTS INTO SEATS INFLUENCE YOUR VOTING BEHAVIOR FOR AT LEAST ONE OF THE TWO HOUSES OF THE PARLIAMENT? 
a) YES 
 b) NO  go to question 7 
6bis) IF SO, HOW? 
  _________________________________  _________________________________  _________________________________  
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Neither disagree nor agree 
Somewhat 
agree Totally agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
7) To choose whether to vote or to abstain, you also considered the probability of a tie between two or more parties   
   
8) To choose whether to vote or to abstain, the easiness and the short time required to cast your ballot played a relevant role   
   




10) You went to cast your ballot because you wanted that other people you know could see you going to the voting station   
   
11) You went to cast your ballot because other people who think as you do could not go to the polls for a variety of reasons   
   
12) You are interested in politics also when there are no electoral campaigns   
   
13) You had to give up something in order to vote (e.g. travel, rest, leisure)   
   
14) HAVE YOU EVER HAD “INSTITUTIONAL DUTIES” (E.G. CLASS OR SCHOOL REPRESENTATIVE, ETC.)? a) YES  b) NO 
15) DID YOU VOTE AT THE PREVIOUS MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS TOO (MAY 15-16, 2011)? a) YES  b) NO 
16) DID YOU VOTE AT THE 2008 POLITICAL ELECTIONS TOO? a) YES            c) N/A if then below 18  b) NO 
17) 
HOW MUCH TIME DID YOU DEDICATE TO VOTING ACTIVITIES (E.G. GOING TO AND QUEUEING AT THE VOTING STATION, ETC.)? DO NOT COUNT THE TIME DEDICATED TO ACTIVITIES THAT YOU WOULD HAVE CARRIED OUT EVEN WITHOUT ELECTIONS 
  _________ Minutes 
18) HOW MUCH TIME WOULD YOU HAVE BEEN WILLING TO DEDICATE, AT MOST, TO VOTING ACTIVITIES (E.G. GOING TO AND QUEUEING AT THE VOTING STATION, ETC.)?  _________ Minutes 
19) HOW MANY HOURS IN A TYPICAL WEEK DO YOU DEDICATE TO GATHERING INFORMATION ABOUT POLITICS (ON NEWSPAPERS, TV, INTERNET, RADIO, ETC.)? 
 _________ Hours 
20) WHAT IS THE HIGHEST SCHOOL DEGREE YOU HAVE OBTAINED SO FAR? 
a) Middle school degree or less b) High school degree (5 years) c) Bachelor’s Degree (3 years) d) > Bachelor’s Degree (3 years) 
21) 
WHAT IS YOUR YEARLY GROSS INCOME BRACKET (EXCLUDING THE INCOME PERCEIVED BY YOUR PARENTS, PARTNER, ETC.)? a) 10 000 € or less (including no income) b) (10 000 €, 20 000 €] c) (20 000 €, 30 000 €] d) (30 000 €, 50 000 €] e) More than 50 000 € 
22) 
HOW “RELATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT” DO YOU THINK IT IS TO BE ELIGIBLE TO CAST A BALLOT BOTH AT THE LOWER AND AT THE UPPER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT AS OPPOSED TO AT THE LOWER HOUSE ONLY? 
a) Less important b) More important, but less than twice as important c) Twice as important d) More than twice as important 
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A.2 Turnout RD Robustness Checks
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Notes: Each black point in the figure represents an RD estimate of the turnout effect of Senate
voting eligibility in Italian parliamentary elections based on a different bandwidth (constrained to
be the same for bias and treatment effect estimation) around the 25-year old discontinuity. Vertical
gray bars denote corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals. The red dot and the red line
denote, respectively, the main RD estimate and 95-percent confidence interval based on Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) procedure (Table 2, column 1).
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Notes: The figure plots RD estimates of the turnout effect of Senate voting eligibility in Italian par-
liamentary elections and corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals based on different placebo
discontinuities. The x-axis denotes the cutoff value used for estimation relative to the actual Senate
voting-eligibility cutoff.
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Notes: The figure plots placebo RD estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals of the turnout
effect of being exactly 25 on the day of a non-parliamentary election. The x-axis denotes the cutoff
value used for estimation relative to the 25-year-old cutoff.
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Table A1: Voter-Level RD Estimates: Placebo Effects Using Voter Covariates as Outcomes
Sample Sample RDD Robust FDR Bwidth RDD
Mean St. Dev. N Estimate p-value q-value (Days) N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education (1996):
Missing education .628 .483 241,305 -.0121 .198 1.000 1,051 24,384
Illiterate .016 .126 241,305 .0014 .157 1.000 1,038 24,069
Elementary school .147 .354 241,305 .0042 .068 .759 1,416 32,957
Middle school .133 .340 241,305 .0095 .247 1.000 1,126 26,166
High school .061 .239 241,305 -.0049 .386 1.000 1,274 29,531
College .015 .123 241,305 .0017 .026 .681 1,540 35,777
Occupation (1996):
Missing occupation or unemployed .643 .479 241,305 -.0121 .169 1.000 1,118 25,915
Agricultural worker .014 .117 241,305 -.0006 .721 1.000 1,930 45,018
Blue-collar worker .052 .222 241,305 -.0003 .669 1.000 1,344 31,295
Artisan .026 .158 241,305 .0002 .995 1.000 1,777 41,415
Retail worker .018 .133 241,305 .0002 .681 1.000 1,727 40,216
White-collar worker (low level) .019 .136 241,305 .0010 .496 1.000 1,855 43,246
White-collar worker (mid level) .041 .198 241,305 -.0002 .764 1.000 1,416 32,957
White-collar worker (high level) .018 .134 241,305 .0001 .541 1.000 1,751 40,785
Homemaker or Retiree .134 .341 241,305 -.0010 .835 1.000 1,774 41,356
Student .036 .186 241,305 .0140 .039 .681 957 22,099
Marital status:
Missing marital status .850 .357 241,305 .0038 .767 1.000 903 20,856
Single, divorced .144 .352 241,305 -.0057 .716 1.000 917 21,169
Married .006 .076 241,305 .0017 .430 1.000 1,519 35,284
Lives in Emilia-Romagna .228 .420 241,305 -.0006 .875 1.000 932 21,594
Female .519 .500 241,305 -.0111 .269 1.000 1,759 40,983
Notes:  Each row reports summary statistics (columns 1-3) and RDD results (columns 4-8) of a different voter 
variable from the pooled Prospex-Bologna sample.  RDD estimates (column 4), p-values (column 5), and 
bandwidths (column 7) are from local linear regressions based on Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth 
selector with HC1 heteroskedasticity-robust variance estimator.  Column 6 reports False Discovery Rate 
(FDR) q-values robust to multiple hypotheses testing based on Anderson (2008)'s procedure.  
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
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A.3 Survey RD Graphs and Summary Statistics
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Age in days − 25 years
Notes: In each plot, the solid red line represents the linear fit of a distinct survey outcome on the age-based running variable. Estimation
bandwidths are chosen following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) and correspond to those reported in Table A2, column 7. Point
clouds represent mean outcomes by bins of the running variable, where the number of equally-spaced bins is chosen following Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2015).
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Age in days − 25 years
Notes: In each plot, the solid red line represents the linear fit of a distinct survey outcome on the age-based running variable. Estimation
bandwidths are chosen following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) and correspond to those reported in Table A2, column 7. Point
clouds represent mean outcomes by bins of the running variable, where the number of equally-spaced bins is chosen following Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2015).
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Table A2: Survey Data: Baseline Characteristics
Sample Sample RDD Robust FDR Bwidth RDD
Mean St. Dev. N Estimate p-value q-value (Days) N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female .452 .498 1,185 .127 .351 .779 1,327 324
Ever had "institutional" roles? (Q14) .376 .484 1,193 .033 .775 .779 1,522 367
Voted in the past municipal election (5/15/2011)? (Q15) .865 .342 999 .105 .163 .678 1,179 284
Voted in the 2008 parliamentary election? (Q16) .917 .276 702 .003 .954 .788 816 191
Educational attainment: (Q20)
Middle-school degree or less .145 .352 1,188 -.063 .234 .678 1,590 384
High-school degree .496 .500 1,188 -.155 .151 .678 1,557 375
Bachelor's degree .198 .399 1,188 .290 .018 .305 1,135 278
More than bachelor's degree .162 .368 1,188 -.043 .532 .779 1,278 315
Income: (Q21)
€10k or less (including no income) .684 .465 1,057 .142 .131 .678 1,489 327
(€10k, €20k] .190 .393 1,057 -.124 .168 .678 1,351 302
(€20k, €30k] .091 .287 1,057 .012 .635 .779 1,369 305
(€30k, €50k] .027 .163 1,057 -.030 .236 .678 943 209
€50k or more .008 .087 1,057 -.024 .291 .775 1,939 441
Notes:  Each row reports summary statistics (columns 1-3) and RDD balancing exercises (columns 4-8) of a different voter 
characteristics from Bologna's survey data.  RDD estimates (column 4), p-values (column 5), and bandwidths (column 7) are 
from local linear regressions based on Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth selector with HC1 heteroskedasticity-robust 
variance estimator.  Column 6 reports False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values robust to multiple hypotheses testing based on 
Anderson (2008)'s procedure.  
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
12
A.4 City-Level Summary Statistics and DD Robustness Checks
To test for Granger causality, we estimate models of the following form:





rT rr(i),t +δi + γt + εi,t , (3)
where τ > t is the date of the next city i’s election. More precisely, if regression 3 is run using,
say, the sample of municipal elections, t denotes the date of a municipal election held in city i, and
τ > t is the date of the following municipal election in the same city.
Equation 3 augments regression 1 with indicator variables for future concurrent elections. The
α’s are the coefficients of interest, which measure the current electoral effect of future coincident
elections. Following the structure of Table 5, Table A5 reports the estimated α’s.
13
Table A3: City-Level Summary Statistics
Election type: ProvincialEuropean Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(runoff) .265 0 0 .250 0 0
1(concurrent provincial election) 1 .422 .189 .274 .030 .030
1(concurrent regional election) .020 .036 1 .111 .052 .052
1(concurrent municipal election) .348 .340 .161 1 .055 .056
City-Level Turnout .651 .700 .702 .729 .823 .822
(.135) (.118) (.115) (.106) (.077) (.077)
(Under- and Over-Votes)/Voters .021 .051 .054 .032 .042 .042
(.019) (.034) (.034) (.021) (.027) (.033)
Valid Votes/Voters .630 .649 .648 .697 .782 .780
(.124) (.108) (.109) (.099) (.083) (.084)
N cities observed both w/ and 
…a provincial election 0 5,366 5,880 4,733 1,048 1,048
…a regional election 127 1,583 0 5,148 2,057 2,057
…a municipal election 2,710 4,985 5,079 0 1,628 1,630
N 18,342 35,343 32,542 38,079 42,423 42,432
Notes:  The table reports summary statistics of city-level data received from the Italian Ministry 
of Interior.  Variables in Panels A and B refer to, respectively, treatments and outcomes for city-
level regressions.  Each column represents a different election type/sample.  Within each each 
column/sample, city-election dates are the units of observation.  Standard deviations of non-
dichotomous variables are reported in parentheses.  All summary statistics are weighted by the 
number of voters in a given city-election date.
A. Covariates and Treatments
B. Outcomes
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Table A4: Turnout Effect of Concurrent Municipal Elections in the Voter-Level ITANES and
Bologna Data
Election type: Regional House
(1) (2)
1(concurrent municipal election) .039 ~ .012
(.021) (.014)
Outcome mean .779 .866
N 174,495 195,703
1(concurrent municipal election) .029 -.002
(.025) (.013)
Outcome mean .786 .853
N 51,139 51,760
Notes:  The table reports estimated effects of concurrent 
municipal elections using voter-level turnout data from 
ITANES and the municipality of Bologna.  Panel A includes 
all voters excluding residents of the four special regions 
which are excluded due to incomplete election calendars in 
these regions), while Panel B focuses on the subsample of 
voters aged 18-30.  All regressions control for election 
round day of the election and city fixed effects.  Standard 
errors clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses.  
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
B. Voters Aged 18-30
A. All Voters
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Table A5: City-Level Placebo Exercises: Granger Causality
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election

) - -.031 ** -.037 ~ -.005 .003 .006
- (.007) (.019) (.008) (.011) (.010)
1(concurrent regional election





) -.013 .004 -.006 - .0005 -.004 ~
(.009) (.004) (.004) - (.002)
Joint test p-value .335 .293 .826 .875 .959 .321
Control outcome mean .631 .686 .693 .729 .838 .836
N 11,270 28,228 25,822 30,966 35,331 35,340
1(concurrent provincial election

) - .003 -.017 ** .0001 .003 .002
- (.002) (.003) (.005) (.004)
1(concurrent regional election





) .003 ~ .002 -.002 - .002 .003
(.002) (.001) (.002) - (.002) (.002)
Joint test p-value .172 .731 .607 .999 .806 .867
Control outcome mean .014 .037 .038 .029 .043 .044
N 11,270 28,228 25,822 30,966 35,331 35,340
1(concurrent provincial election

) - -.033 ** -.020 -.005 .001 .005
- (.009) (.017) (.007) (.015) (.013)
1(concurrent regional election





) -.016 ~ .003 -.004 - -.001 -.007 **
(.009) (.003) (.004) - (.002) (.003)
Joint test p-value .188 .130 .872 .808 .673 .026
Control outcome mean .617 .649 .656 .699 .795 .792
N 11,270 28,228 25,822 30,966 35,331 35,340
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
A. City-Level Turnout
B. (Under- and Over-Votes)/Voters
C. Valid Votes/Voters
Notes:  The table reports results from placebo regressions of turnout (Panel A), invalid votes (Panel B), 
and valid votes (Panel C) on future concurrent provincial, regional, and municipal elections.  Each column 
represents a different election sample.  All regressions are weighted by voter counts and control for 
current and future election round (i.e., first round or runoff; only relevant for provincial and municipal 
elections), day of the election, city fixed effects, as well as dummies for concurrent provincial, regional 
and municipal elections.  Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses.  P-
values robust to clustering at the region level, reported in braces, are computed with a 10,000-replication 
wild bootstrap using Webb (2014) weights.  P-values of joint insignificance are robust to clustering at the 
province level.  
{.849}{.855}{.795}{.890}







Table A6: City-Level Robustness Checks: Excluding Anomalies in Municipal Election Calendars
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election) - .039 ** .021 .002 .012 .012
- (.010) (.015) (.004) (.012) (.012)
1(concurrent regional election) -.014 .123 - .016 -.001 .002
(.943) -
1(concurrent municipal election) .113 ** .091 ** .067 ** - .054 ** .053 **
(.007) (.006) (.009) - (.011)
Joint test p-value .002 .000 .000 .772 .000 .000
Control outcome mean .592 .639 .669 .704 .825 .824
N 18,098 35,038 32,104 33,632 41,141 41,148
1(concurrent provincial election) - .018 ** .001 .005 ** .008 ** .006 **
- (.003) (.006) (.001) (.002) (.002)
1(concurrent regional election) .006 .033 - .004 .013 .013
(.748) -
1(concurrent municipal election) .025 ** .025 ** .021 ** - .020 ** .021 **
(.002) (.003) (.004) - (.003) (.003)
Joint test p-value .000 .000 .000 .076 .000 .000
Control outcome mean .013 .032 .045 .027 .041 .042
N 18,098 35,038 32,104 33,632 41,141 41,148
1(concurrent provincial election) - .021 ** .021 -.003 .004 .006
- (.008) (.013) (.004) (.012) (.011)
1(concurrent regional election) -.021 .090 - .012 -.014 -.012
(.911) -
1(concurrent municipal election) .088 ** .067 ** .046 ** - .034 ** .032 **
(.007) (.005) (.009) - (.009) (.008)
Joint test p-value .006 .000 .003 .804 .001 .002
Control outcome mean .579 .607 .623 .676 .785 .782
N 18,098 35,038 32,104 33,632 41,141 41,148
A. City-Level Turnout
C. Valid Votes/Voters
{.516} {.778} {.866} {.887}
{.387}{.323}{.586}{.532}
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
Notes:  The table reports the same estimates as Table 5.  Differently from Table 5, however, all samples 
exclude election dates coinciding with irregularities in municipal election calendars (i.e., municipal 




B. (Under- and Over-Votes)/Voters
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Table A7: Effect of Concurrent Elections on Invalid Ballots: North vs. South
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election) - .010 ** -.010 * .005 ** .002 .002 ~
- (.002) (.004) (.001) (.002) (.001)
1(concurrent regional election) - .003 - .004 .007 .010
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .023 ** .017 ** .017 ** - .014 ** .012 **
(.002) (.001) (.003) - (.002) (.003)
Control outcome mean .011 .030 .047 .028 .035 .037
N 13,042 24,510 24,020 25,991 29,430 29,437
1(concurrent provincial election) - .030 ** .015 ** .004 ** .019 ** .018 **
- (.004) (.005) (.001) (.004) (.005)
1(concurrent regional election) - .066 - .004 .028 .024
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .038 ** .056 ** .046 ** - .050 ** .046 **
(.003) (.004) (.005) - (.004) (.003)
Control outcome mean .015 .036 .040 .026 .052 .052
N 5,300 10,833 8,522 12,088 12,993 12,995
(Under- and Over-Votes)/Voters
Notes:  The table reports estimated effects of concurrent provincial, regional, and municipal elections on 
invalid votes in Northern (Panel A) and Southern regions (Panel B).  Each column represents a different 
election sample.  All regressions are weighted by voter counts and control for election round (i.e., first 
round or runoff; only relevant for provincial and municipal elections), day of the election, and city fixed 
effects.  Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses.  P-values robust to 
clustering at the region level, reported in braces, are computed with a 10,000-replication wild bootstrap 
using Webb (2014) weights.  
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
B. Southern Regions
A. Northern and Central Regions
{.943} {.669} {.498} {.469}
{.400}{.330}{.598}{.95}
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Table A8: Effect of Concurrent Elections on Valid Ballots: North vs. South
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election) - .0002 .009 -.002 -.011 * -.010 *
- (.008) (.003) (.004) (.005)
1(concurrent regional election) - .032 - .012 -.016 -.016
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .093 ** .065 ** .026 ** - -.005 * -.004
(.007) (.005) (.006) - (.002) (.004)
Control outcome mean .584 .663 .642 .680 .827 .822
N 13,042 24,510 24,020 25,991 29,430 29,437
1(concurrent provincial election) - .057 ** .020 ** -.001 .037 * .039 *
- (.012) (.007) (.004) (.018) (.019)
1(concurrent regional election) - .174 - .005 .087 .092
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .075 ** .117 ** .057 ** - .016 ** .021 **
(.016) (.009) (.007) - (.004) (.004)
Control outcome mean .567 .485 .570 .681 .700 .696
N 5,300 10,833 8,522 12,088 12,993 12,995
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
Valid Votes/Voters
A. Northern and Central Regions
B. Southern Regions
Notes:  The table reports estimated effects of concurrent provincial, regional, and municipal elections on 
valid votes in Northern (Panel A) and Southern regions (Panel B).  Each column represents a different 
election sample.  All regressions are weighted by voter counts and control for election round (i.e., first 
round or runoff; only relevant for provincial and municipal elections), day of the election, and city fixed 
effects.  Standard errors clustered at the province level are reported in parentheses.  P-values robust to 
clustering at the region level, reported in braces, are computed with a 10,000-replication wild bootstrap 
using Webb (2014) weights.  
{.836}{.839}{.812}{.844}
{.96} {.908} {.25} {.28}
(.0024)
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Table A9: Effect of Concurrent Elections on Turnout: Municipalities with Low vs. High Shares of
College Graduates
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election) - .045 ** .038 ** .003 .022 .023
- (.012) (.015) (.005) (.014) (.014)
1(concurrent regional election) - .144 - .013 -.001 -.000
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .107 ** .106 ** .095 ** - .056 ** .054 **
(.008) (.009) (.011) - (.010) (.009)
Control outcome mean .572 .621 .659 .739 .814 .811
N 9,125 17,458 15,726 18,080 20,974 20,968
1(concurrent provincial election) - .037 ** .013 .006 -.006 -.006
- (.010) (.013) (.004) (.013) (.012)
1(concurrent regional election) - .106 - .014 .002 .005
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .114 ** .096 ** .063 ** - .026 ** .025 **
(.008) (.008) (.009) - (.007) (.008)
Control outcome mean .596 .643 .671 .702 .829 .828
N 9,217 17,885 16,816 19,999 21,449 21,464
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
A. Cities w/ Low Share of College Graduates
Notes:  The table reports estimated effects of concurrent provincial, regional, and municipal elections on 
turnout in municipalities with share of college graduates lower than (Panel A) or higher than the median 
city (Panel B).  Each column represents a different election sample.  All regressions are weighted by 
voter counts and control for election round (i.e., first round or runoff; only relevant for provincial and 
municipal elections), day of the election, and city fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the province 
level are reported in parentheses.  P-values robust to clustering at the region level, reported in braces, are 
computed with a 10,000-replication wild bootstrap using Webb (2014) weights.  
City-Level Turnout
B. Cities w/ High Share of College Graduates
{.999}{.998}{.873}{.565}
{.51} {.747} {.98} {.95}
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Table A10: Effect of Concurrent Elections on Turnout: Municipalities with Low vs. High Average
Income
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election) - .070 ** .039 ** .003 .043 * .046 **
- (.011) (.008) (.005) (.018) (.018)
1(concurrent regional election) - .214 - .001 .026 .026
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .106 ** .139 ** .101 ** - .066 ** .065 **
(.009) (.010) (.008) - (.005) (.006)
Control outcome mean .587 .562 .626 .733 .776 .772
N 9,081 17,726 15,390 18,702 21,290 21,286
1(concurrent provincial election) - .025 ** .004 .004 -.009 -.009
- (.008) (.012) (.004) (.006) (.006)
1(concurrent regional election) - .081 - .014 -.002 .001
- -
1(concurrent municipal election) .122 ** .085 ** .057 ** - .019 ** .019 **
(.009) (.006) (.009) - (.005) (.007)
Control outcome mean .592 .663 .681 .701 .844 .843
N 9,261 17,617 17,152 19,377 21,133 21,146
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, ~ p < 0.10
A. Cities w/ Low Average Income
Notes:  The table reports estimated effects of concurrent provincial, regional, and municipal elections on 
turnout in municipalities with average income lower than (Panel A) or higher than in the median city 
(Panel B).  Each column represents a different election sample.  All regressions are weighted by voter 
counts and control for election round (i.e., first round or runoff; only relevant for provincial and municipal 
elections), day of the election, and city fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the province level are 
reported in parentheses.  P-values robust to clustering at the region level, reported in braces, are 
computed with a 10,000-replication wild bootstrap using Webb (2014) weights.  
City-Level Turnout
B. Cities w/ High Average Income
{.702}{.706}{.975}{.972}
{.52} {.779} {.98} {.99}
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A.5 DD P-Values Robust To Multiple Inference
Table A11: Effect of Concurrent Elections on Turnout, Invalid Ballots, and Valid Ballots - Multiple
Inference
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election) - .039 .020 .006 -.004 -.004
- [.000] [.161] [.101] [.774] [.795]
- <.001> <.292> <.188> <1.000> <1.000>
1(concurrent regional election) -.011 .118 - .016 .002 .005
{.949} {.522} - {.738} {.985} {.959}
<1.000> <.921> - <1.000> <1.000> <1.000>
1(concurrent municipal election) .118 .099 .070 - .031 .030
[.000] [.000] [.000] - [.000] [.001]
<.001> <.001> <.001> - <.001> <.003>
Control outcome mean .591 .639 .669 .708 .825 .824
N 18,342 35,343 32,542 38,079 42,423 42,432
1(concurrent provincial election) - .018 .001 .005 .001 .002
- [.000] [.898] [.000] [.854] [.462]
- <.001> <1.000> <.001> <1.000> <.921>
1(concurrent regional election) .007 .033 - .004 .014 .014
{.691} {.537} - {.515} {.340} {.396}
<1.000> <.921> - <.921> <.679> <.817>
1(concurrent municipal election) .027 .027 .022 - .029 .025
[.000] [.000] [.000] - [.000] [.000]
<.001> <.001> <.001> - <.001> <.001>
Control outcome mean .013 .032 .045 .028 .041 .042
N 18,342 35,343 32,542 38,079 42,423 42,432
1(concurrent provincial election) - .021 .019 .001 -.005 -.005
- [.006] [.130] [.731] [.715] [.680]
- <.011> <.238> <1.000> <1.000> <1.000>
1(concurrent regional election) -.018 .086 - .011 -.012 -.010
{.908} {.521} - {.781} {.881} {.910}
<1.000> <.921> - <1.000> <1.000> <1.000>
1(concurrent municipal election) .090 .072 .048 - .002 .005
[.000] [.000] [.000] - [.755] [.441]
<.001> <.001> <.001> - <1.000> <.919>
Control outcome mean .578 .607 .623 .680 .785 .782
N 18,342 35,343 32,542 38,079 42,423 42,432
Notes:  The table reports the same point estimates as Table 5.  Province-clustered asymptotic p-values are reported in 
brackets.  Wild bootstrap p-values robust to clustering at the region level are reported in braces.  False Discovery Rate 
(FDR) q-values robust to multiple hypotheses testing are reported in angle brackets and are based on Anderson (2008)'s 
procedure.  
C. Valid Votes/Voters
B. (Under- and Over-Votes)/Voters
A. City-Level Turnout
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Table A12: Effect of Concurrent Elections on Turnout: North vs. South - Multiple Inference
Election type: Provincial European Regional Municipal House Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(concurrent provincial election) - .010 -.001 .004 -.008 -.008
- [.010] [.877] [.202] [.105] [.081]
- <.014> <.395> <.152> <.087> <.071>
1(concurrent regional election) - .035 - .016 -.009 -.006
- {.862} - {.788} {.916} {.944}
- <.395> - <.395> <.395> <.395>
1(concurrent municipal election) .116 .083 .043 - .009 .007
[.000] [.000] [.000] - [.001] [.031]
<.001> <.001> <.001> - <.002> <.033>
Control outcome mean .595 .693 .689 .708 .861 .859
N 13,042 24,510 24,020 25,991 29,430 29,437
1(concurrent provincial election) - .087 .035 .003 .056 .057
- [.000] [.000] [.526] [.014] [.019]
- <.001> <.001> <.295> <.019> <.023>
1(concurrent regional election) - .240 - .009 .115 .116
- {.956} - {.868} {.128} {.154}
- <.395> - <.395> <.102> <.119>
1(concurrent municipal election) .113 .173 .104 - .066 .067
[.000] [.000] [.000] - [.000] [.000]
<.001> <.001> <.001> - <.001> <.001>
Control outcome mean .583 .521 .610 .707 .752 .748
N 5,300 10,833 8,522 12,088 12,993 12,995
B. Southern Regions
Notes:  The table reports the same point estimates as Table 6.  Province-clustered asymptotic p-values are reported in 
brackets.  Wild bootstrap p-values robust to clustering at the region level are reported in braces.  False Discovery Rate 
(FDR) q-values robust to multiple hypotheses testing are reported in angle brackets and are based on Anderson (2008)'s 
procedure.  
City-Level Turnout
A. Northern and Central Regions
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